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The primary goal of the Duke Law Journal’s Symposium on
Evaluating Judging, Judges, and Judicial Institutions was to bring
together judges and academics researching judges. Conversations
between these groups can be constructive on both sides. Judges may
benefit from learning about studies that show the influences on judicial
performance or that demonstrate which reforms can improve the
quality of judging. Academics may benefit by discovering new ideas
that have not yet been researched or by understanding how judging in
the real world compares with their view of judging.
Some of the discussions at the Symposium highlighted an area
where academics’ perceptions of judging conflict with judges’ actual
experiences. Judges and academics view the significance of judicial
dissents quite differently. Whereas many of the judges believe that
dissents primarily reflect the level of cohesiveness and collegiality of
the court, academics typically place much more significance on the
meaning of judicial dissents. For example, recent academic studies
have asserted that judicial dissents often reveal the influence of judges’
retention concerns,1 the level of judges’ independence,2 or certain
judges’ higher propensity for risk taking.3
Copyright © 2018 Joanna Shepherd.
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the Legal Workshop as part of the Duke Law Journal’s 2010 “Symposium on Evaluating Judging,
Judges, and Judicial Institutions.”
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THEORETICAL ECON. 88, 105 (2010).
2. Stephen J. Choi, G. Mitu Gulati & Eric A. Posner, Professionals or Politicians: The
Uncertain Empirical Case for an Elected Rather than Appointed Judiciary, 26 J.L. ECON. & ORG.
(forthcoming 2010), available at http://jleo.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprint/ewn016.
3. Paul Brace & Melinda Gann Hall, Integrated Models of Judicial Dissent, 55 J. POL. 914,
920 (1993); Paul Brace & Melinda Gann Hall, Neo-Institutionalism and Dissent in State Supreme
Courts, 52 J. POL. 54, 59 (1990); Melinda Gann Hall & Paul Brace, Order in the Courts: A NeoInstitutional Approach to Judicial Consensus, 42 W. POL. Q. 391, 398 (1989).
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In contrast, many judges at the Symposium considered academics’
emphasis on judicial dissents to be misguided. The judges maintained
that dissents reveal less about judges’ retention concerns, impartiality,
or risk preferences, and more about the culture of collegiality on the
court. Many of the judges believe that dissents primarily reflect the
level of cohesiveness among judges, and that various factors and
institutions influence this cohesiveness. For example, they explained
that the personal relationships, amount of professional and social
interaction, and diversity among judges on a court might influence the
level of dissent. Many of the judges hypothesized that courts that are
more collegial, either because the judges are better friends or share
more common values or backgrounds, should have lower dissent rates.
Judges on these courts should be less likely to openly criticize the
opinions of their colleagues by dissenting.
Although academics have long recognized that institutions such as
opinion-assignment procedures and voting order might influence the
propensity to dissent,4 empirical studies have failed to consider the
impact of collegiality and personal relationships on dissent rates. Thus,
in this short Essay, I empirically test whether some of the judges’
assertions are consistent with the data. I test whether various measures
of diversity are associated with dissent rates in state supreme courts. I
find that diversity in many areas—gender, race, age, religion, home
state, and political affiliation—is associated with higher levels of
dissent. In contrast, diversity in the jobs that judges had before taking
the bench is associated with lower dissent rates.5
I also test whether the length of time judges have served on the
court is associated with dissent rates. Presumably, judges that have
served on a court together for many years would have stronger
friendships than newer judges, and thus may be more collegial and less
likely to dissent. However, my empirical analysis finds the opposite: the
greater the number of judges with lengthy tenures on the court, the
higher the dissent rate.

4. Melinda Gann Hall, Docket Control as an Influence on Judicial Voting, 10 JUST. SYS. J.
243, 243 (1985).
5. A recent study has explored the relationship between political, gender, and racial
diversity on opinion publication practices. Although the study finds that gender and racial
diversity have little impact on publication rates, it finds that political diversity among circuit court
judges decreases the number of district court judges’ opinion publications, while increasing the
length of those publications. Stephen J. Choi, G. Mitu Gulati & Eric A. Posner, What Do Federal
District Judges Want? An Analysis of Publications, Citations, and Reversals 23–25 (Univ. of Chi.
Law & Econ., Olin Working Paper No. 508, 2010), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1536723.
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EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
To test the influence of diversity and tenure on judges’ propensity
to dissent, I use data from the State Supreme Court Data Archive. This
data includes an almost universal sample of state supreme court cases
in all fifty states from 1995 to 1998. The data include more than twentyeight thousand decisions involving more than 470 individual state
supreme court justices.6 The data include variables that reflect case
histories, case participants, legal issues, case outcomes, and individual
justices’ behavior. I supplemented these data with institutional
variables that describe aspects of each state’s judicial system, and with
detailed information about each judge’s personal characteristics,
background, and career.
Thus, my data consist of individual judge-level votes in each case
before the state supreme courts. I use an ordinary probit model to test
whether diversity and tenure on a court influence judges’ likelihood of
dissenting. The dependent variable in my estimation is an indicator
variable for whether an individual judge casts a dissenting vote in each
case.
My estimation includes several measures of the diversity of judges’
personal characteristics and backgrounds on each court. I measure the
diversity of each personal characteristic on each court with an index
that is essentially one minus a Herfindahl index of each characteristic:7
Diversity of personal characteristic = 1 – xj (# of judges of each type j /
total # of judges)2.

For example, diversity along the racial dimension would be measured
with:
Diversity of race = 1 − xj (# of judges of each race j / total # of judges)2,
where j = [White, African American, Asian, Hispanic, and other].

The diversity measure ranges from zero, when the court is composed
of judges of only one “type” (that is, race), to one, when each type is
represented equally on the court. Thus, increases in this measure
indicate an increase in diversity on the court.8
6. State dockets exceeding two hundred cases in a single year are selected from a random
sample of two hundred cases. Typically, case quantities are unaffected due to the limited size of
many state supreme court dockets.
7. Albert O. Hirschman, The Paternity of an Index, 54 AM. ECON. REV. 761, 761 (1964).
8. This diversity index is the standard measure of diversity used by both the U.S. Census
Bureau and other studies on diversity. Alberto Alesina, Reza Baqir & William Easterly, Public
Goods and Ethnic Divisions, 114 Q.J. ECON. 1243, 1254 (1999).
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I include variables that measure diversity along several different
dimensions: gender, race (White, African American, Asian, Hispanic,
and other), age (under 45, 46 to 55, 56 to 65, and over 65), religion
(Protestant, Catholic, Jewish, Greek Orthodox, Mormon, and other),
home state (from the state where the court is located or from another
state), political party affiliation (Republican, Democrat, or
Independent), and job held before taking the bench (prosecutor,
attorney general, elected official, lower-court judge, or nonelected
official).
I also include two variables that represent judges’ tenure on the
court. I include the percentage of judges on each court that have served
for one year or less; presumably, these judges have not served long
enough to develop strong personal relationships with other judges. I
also include the percentage of judges on each court that have served
for six years or more; if these judges have developed stronger
friendships, they may be more collegial and less likely to dissent.
In addition to the diversity and tenure variables, the estimations
include a series of judge-level, case-level, and state-level variables that
might be related to judges’ propensity to cast dissenting votes. The
judge-level variables include an indicator for whether a particular
judge is the chief justice on the court, and a variable indicating the
number of years until the judge’s next retention.9 These variables
control for voting changes throughout a judge’s career and term.
All estimations also include various case-level variables that may
be related to dissenting votes. First, I include indicator variables for
whether a case is a criminal case, a juvenile case, a civil case involving
the state government, or a civil case involving private individuals. Thus,
the base category is nonadversarial cases, such as cases involving
certification and advisory opinions. Finally, I include indicator
variables for whether at least one litigant is a business, a person, or a
representative of the state government. These indicator variables
control for any relationship between dissent rates and the litigants or
legal issues in a case.
Next, I include various state-level characteristics that have been
found to be related to dissenting votes. First, I include an indicator
variable for whether judges in the state face reelection by the voters.
In a previous study, I found empirical results suggesting that judges’
9. This variable is actually the reverse of the years to retention. Because the longest number
of years to retention during my sample is twelve, the inverse years to retention is thirteen minus
the years to retention.
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reelection concerns are important influences on their propensity to cast
dissenting votes.10
I also include a variable that indicates whether the state has a
lower appellate court, and thus, whether the court has discretionary
review to hear cases. Numerous studies report that the presence of an
intermediate appellate court increases dissent rates, suggesting that
discretionary dockets facilitate the expression of dissent.11
The state-level variables also include indicator variables for
whether a court utilizes a random opinion-assignment procedure
instead of a discretionary procedure, and whether voting takes place in
the order of seniority. Random or rotating opinion-assignment
procedures prevent judges from being rewarded or sanctioned for their
opposition votes, and thus reduce the incentives for consensus.12 In
contrast, when opinions are assigned by the chief justice, opportunities
for rewards and sanctions emerge. Similarly, when voting takes place
in order of seniority, the most senior judges may influence junior
judges, reducing the likelihood of their disagreement.13
Moreover, all estimations include year indicators to capture trends
in the likelihood of dissent. In the probit estimations, the t-statistics are
computed from standard errors clustered by case.
Table 1 reports the primary probit results. In this table, the top
number in each cell is the regression coefficient, which indicates the
magnitude and direction of the relationship of each variable with
judges’ votes. A negative coefficient indicates that a variable reduces
the probability that a judge will cast a dissenting vote; a positive
coefficient indicates that a variable increases the probability that a
judge will dissent. Under each coefficient is the corresponding tstatistic. Coefficients with t-statistics equal to or greater than 1.96 are
considered statistically significant at the 5 percent level, meaning that
there is 95 percent certainty that the coefficient is different from zero.
A t-statistic equal to or greater than 1.96 is typically required to draw
conclusions in hypothesis testing.

10. Shepherd, supra note 1, at 105.
11. H. Glick & G. Pruet, Jr., Dissent in State Supreme Courts: Patterns and Correlates of
Conflict, in JUDICIAL CONFLICT AND CONSENSUS: BEHAVIORAL STUDIES OF AMERICAN
APPELLATE COURTS 199, 200 (Sheldon Goldman & Charles M. Lamb eds., 1986); Hall & Brace,
supra note 3, at 398.
12. Hall, supra note 4, at 250.
13. See Hall & Brace, supra note 3, at 397.
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The results indicate that diversity among the judges hearing a case
is significantly related to the propensity to dissent. The positive and
statistically significant coefficients on the diversity variables for
gender, race, age, religion, home state, and political affiliation indicate
that diversity along these dimensions is associated with higher levels of
dissent. These results are consistent with the Symposium judges’ belief
that dissent reflects lack of cohesiveness on a court; greater diversity
probably implies that the judges have fewer common values and
experiences, reducing the incentives for collegiality.
In contrast, diversity in the jobs that judges held before taking the
bench is negatively associated with dissent. This suggests that more
diversity in professional backgrounds is associated with a reduction in
the propensity to dissent. Thus, different backgrounds, at least in terms
of the judges’ professional lives, do not appear to reduce collegiality on
a court.
Moreover, the results indicate that the more judges with very short
tenure on the court (one year or less), the less likely judges are to
dissent. Similarly, the more judges with lengthy tenures on the court
(six years or more), the more likely judges are to dissent. If lengthy
tenure is a good proxy for strong personal relationships among judges,
then these results are inconsistent with the experiences of some of the
judges participating in the Symposium. Instead of lengthy tenures
reducing the propensity to dissent because judges are better friends,
my results indicate that lengthy tenures increase the propensity to
dissent. Nevertheless, the results are consistent with studies that assert
that junior judges feel pressure to not dissent against more experienced
senior judges.14 Thus, even if judges build stronger personal
relationships during their time on the court, their inclinations to agree
with friends may be outweighed by the confidence and experience that
comes with longer tenure on the court.
Several other variables also have statistically significant
relationships with the propensity to dissent. Judicial elections,
discretionary dockets, random opinion assignment, and seniority
voting are associated with increases in dissent rates. In contrast, an
approaching retention and chief justice status appear to reduce the
propensity to dissent.

14. This “freshman effect”—the lower likelihood of junior judges to dissent—has been found
in Virginia A. Hettinger, Stefanie A. Lindquist & Wendy L. Martinek, Acclimation Effects and
Separate Opinion Writing in the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 84 SOC. SCI. Q. 792, 802 (2003).
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CONCLUSION
In this short Essay, I tested whether the empirical evidence is
consistent with the experiences of some of the judges participating in
the Duke Law Journal’s Symposium on Evaluating Judging, Judges,
and Judicial Institutions. Although my results confirmed that
institutional and political factors are important influences on dissent
rates, I also found that the levels of cohesiveness and collegiality
among judges are important. These results indicate that academic
studies of judging can greatly benefit if academics consider the realworld experiences of judges.
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Table 1
Variable
Judge Faces Reelection
Years to Retention (reverse)
Chief Justice
Lower Appellate Court
Random Opinion Assignment
Seniority Voting
Diversity in Age
Diversity in Gender
Diversity in Race
Diversity in Religion
Diversity in Political Party
Diversity in Previous Job
Percentage of Judges on the Court
for One Year or Less
Percentage of Judges on the Court
for Six Years or More
Number of Observations
Log Likelihood

Likelihood of
Dissenting Vote
0.54*
(15.92)
-0.014*
(5.25)
-0.13*
(6.13)
0.078*
(3.09)
0.127*
(6.13)
0.067*
(2.97)
0.353*
(4.83)
0.403*
(6.03)
0.236*
(4.0)
0.158*
(4.1)
0.184*
(5.26)
-0.293*
(10.74)
-0.293*
(2.26)
0.314*
(5.67)
84178
-19318

Notes: The table reports coefficients from a probit model. For
brevity, the indicator variables for years, case types, and litigant types
are not reported here. T-statistics are reported in parentheses. An
asterisk represents significance at the 5 percent level.

